This paper analyzes which type of intrinsic preferences drive an agent's behavior in a sequential public good game depending on whether the agent is first or second mover. Theoretical predictions are based on heterogeneity of individuals in terms of social and risk preferences. We modelize...

Willingness to take risk depends on whether the risk affects others as well as oneself and on how the risk affects oneś position vis-á-vis others. Taking a bet can improve oneś position relative to others or threaten it. We present an experiment that explores individual attitudes to lotteries...

We develop and implement a new measure for inequality aversion: two peers are endowed with identical binary lotteries and the only choice they make is whether they want to play out the lotteries independently or with perfect positive correlation (coupling). Coupling has no other e ect than...

We experimentally investigate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation, where the socially efficient outcome may be encouraged by risk aversion and/or inequality aversion.The first part of our experiment is devoted to the elicitation of subjects' aversion profile, taking care to not...

We study the role of alternative intertemporal preference representations in a model of economic growth, stock pollutant and endogenous risk of catastrophic collapse. We contrast the traditional “discounted utility” model, which assumes risk neutrality with respect to intertemporal utility,...

This note provides an alternative derivation of the leximin principle using the framework of Harsanyi’s (1953) equi-probability model. We demonstrate that the leximin principle is concluded if and only if the preference ordering of the impartial observer obeys strong monotonicity and complete...

Wie viel Umverteilung Bürgerinnen und Bürger in der Gesellschaft möchten, hängt von sozioökonomischen Faktoren und ihren Ansichten über Gerechtigkeit ab. Diese Studie, basierend auf einer in Schweden durchgeführten, repräsentativen Umfrage, bestätigt frühere Ergebnisse: Demnach nimmt...

We propose a straightforward dominance procedure for comparing social welfare orderings (SWOs) with respect to the degree of inequality aversion they express. Three versions of the procedure are considered, each of which uses a different underlying criterion of inequality comparisons: (i) a...

Hammond (J Econ Theory 11, 465–467, 1975), Meyer (J Econ Theory 11, 119–132, 1975), and Lambert (The distribution and redistribution of income, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001) provide the formal result connecting leximin and the idea of extreme inequality aversion for social...

Risk aversion is typically inferred from real or hypothetical choices over risky lotteries, but such “untutored” choices may reflect mistakes rather than preferences. We develop a procedure to disentangle preferences from mistakes: after eliciting untutored choices, we confront participants...