This dissertation presents four independent papers that advance experimental methods and test theories on saving using experimentally elicited characteristics. The first two papers test two behavioral theories on precautionary saving based on the characteristics loss aversion and prudence by...

This paper empirically examines the behavioral precautionary saving hypothesis by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) stating that uncertainty about future income triggers saving because of loss aversion. We extend their theoretical analysis to also consider the internal margin, i.e., the strength, of loss...

This paper empirically examines the behavioral precautionary saving hypothesis by Koszegi and Rabin (2009) stating that uncertainty about future income triggers saving because of loss aversion. We extend their theoretical analysis to also consider the internal margin, i.e., the strength, of loss...

This paper empirically examines the behavioral precautionary saving hypothesis that uncertainty about future income triggers an increase in saving because of loss aversion. Guided by the theoretical model of Koszegi and Rabin (2009), we first extend their theoretical analysis to also consider...

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal-agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a...

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal-agent problem with multiple agents. When output distributions are uncertain, models of ambiguity aversion suggest that tournaments may become more attractive than independent wage contracts, in contrast to the case where output...

Do individuals prefer to compete fairly, or unfairly with an opponent? We study individuals who can choose how to compete for one ex-post nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair...

We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's...