This paper theoretically and experimentally studies the role of two behavioral biases in all-pay auctions for charity. The theory is developed to predict the effect of loss aversion in the first-price all-pay auction and sunk cost sensitivity in the war of attrition. Using controlled laboratory...

In this paper we provide experimental evidence on the relation of individual risk attitudes and subjects' aversion to favorable inequality. In a within-subjects design we expand Blanco et al.'s (2011) modified dictator game by the risk-elicitation task of Eckel and Grossman (2002). Our data show...

To accurately predict behavior economists need reliable measures of individual time preferences and attitudes toward risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount...

Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental...