We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...

We correlate choice under risk in Holt-Laury lottery tasks for gains and losses with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol, the use of hormonal contraceptives, menstrual cycle information as well as the digit ratio (2D:4D) in more than 200 subjects. Risk aversion is...

I propose a simple method to nonparametrically estimate the utility function in first-price, sealed-bid auctions when bidders’ participation is exogenous. Using a pair of bid densities, each for a different number of bidders, I establish a contraction mapping that converges to the true utility...

We correlate choice under risk in Holt-Laury lottery tasks for gains and losses with salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol, the use of hormonal contraceptives, menstrual cycle information as well as the digit ratio (2D:4D) in more than 200 subjects. Risk aversion is...

We study the correlation of choice under risk in Holt-Laury lotteries for gains and losses with gender, the use of hormonal contraceptives, menstrual cycle information, salivary testosterone, estradiol, progesterone, and cortisol as well as the digit ratio (2D:4D) in more than 200 subjects. In...

When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.

This paper considers second-price, sealed-bid auctions with a buy price where bidders' types are discretely distributed. We characterize all equilibria, restricting our attention to equilibria where bidders whose types are less than a buy price bid their own valuations. Budish and Takeyama...

We analyze multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers. As the number of suppliers increases or the suppliers become more risk-averse, the equilibrium bidding price decreases under the first-score auction but remains the same under the second-score auction. A buyer prefers...

We use perturbation analysis to study independent private-value all-pay auctions with weakly risk-averse buyers. We show that under weak risk aversion: 1) Buyers with low values bid lower and buyers with high values bid higher than they would bid in the risk neutral case. 2) Buyers with low...