We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods … betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. …

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods … betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. …

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods … betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited. …

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods … betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited …

We investigate whether there is a link between conditional cooperation and betrayal aversion. We use a public goods … betrayal aversion for those who expect substantial contributions by others. This is consistent with their social risk taking in … optimistic ones typically contribute to the public good and thus take the social risk of being exploited …

Willingness to take risk depends on whether the risk affects others as well as oneself and on how the risk affects oneś … position vis-á-vis others. Taking a bet can improve oneś position relative to others or threaten it. We present an experiment … apparent whether the unfair safe social outcome benefits them or the other. Subjects are also more risk averse when facing …

terms of social and risk preferences. We modelize preferences according to the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt … (1999) and to the assumption of constant relative risk aversion. Risk aversion is significantly and negatively correlated … taking into account the order of agents' play to correctly understand which type of preferences influences cooperation in …

substitutes. The theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). As predicted, we find that …, but not by individualsʼ risk attitudes. Apparently, the global and the local structure of a network does not leave much … explanatory room for individual effects that pertain to risk taking. …