This Inaugural Lecture in the Distinguished Visitor Public Lecture Series of Trinity College Dublin School of Law synthesizes, in a readily accessible form, several of my recent articles examining why and how governments should regulate risk-taking by banks and other systemically important...

This article rethinks the shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance, arguing that bondholders, who are more risk averse than shareholders, should be included in the governance of systemically important firms. The inclusion of bondholders not only could help to reduce systemic risk but...

Excessive risk-taking by systemically important financial firms was one of the leading causes of the financial crisis. Research suggests these firms may be no safer today than they were pre-crisis, and they may even be increasing their risk-taking. Risk-taking is inherently a corporate...

Most of the regulatory measures to control excessive risk taking by systemically important firms are designed to reduce moral hazard and to align the interests of managers and investors. These measures may be flawed because they are based on questionable assumptions. Excessive corporate risk...

The coronavirus has produced a public health debacle of the first-order. But the virus is also propagating the kind of exogenous shock that can precipitate – and to a considerable degree is already precipitating – a systemic event for our financial system. This currently unfolding systemic...

Although governments could protect against the economic devastation of future pandemics by requiring businesses to insure against pandemic-related risks, insurers do not currently offer that insurance. Even given sufficient actuarial data to set underwriting standards and rate tables, insurers...