Anti-selection occurs when information asymmetry exists between an insurer and an applicant. When an applicant knows that they are at high risk of loss, but the insurer does not, the applicant may try to exploit this knowledge differential to secure insurance at a lower premium that does not...

This paper analyzes optimal prevention in a situation of multiple, possibly correlated risks. We focus on probability reduction (self-protection) so that correlation becomes endogenous. If prevention concerns only one risk, introducing a second exogenous risk increases the level of prevention...

This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period framework. Here risk management incentives and consumption smoothing incentives are traded off, and the monotonic relationship between self-insurance and risk aversion may no longer...

Probability weighting is often used to explain insurance choices that conflict with expected utility (EU) preferences. We derive new theoretical results on the effects of probability weighting in the context of common insurance demand puzzles. We identify decreasing relative overweighting (DRO)...