We consider a monocentric city where a traffic bottleneck is located at the entrance of the central business district. The commuters’ departure times from home, residential locations, and lot sizes, are all endogenous. We show that elimination of queuing time under optimal road pricing induces...

This paper models strategic interactions between a product supplier, a provider of information about product quality, and end users, in the context of road transportation. Using a game-theoretical analysis of suppliers' pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic...

This paper models strategic interactions between a product supplier, a provider of information about product quality, and end users, in the context of road transportation. Using a game-theoretical analysis of suppliers' pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic...

This paper explores the interrelations between pricing, capacity choice and financing in transportation networks. It builds on the famous Mohring-Harwitz result on self-financing of optimally designed roads under optimal congestion pricing, and specifically investigates its ins and outs in a...

Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that, under certain conditions, an optimally designed and priced road would generate user toll revenues just sufficient to cover its capital costs. Several scholars subsequently explored the robustness of that finding. This paper briefly summarizes further...

The traditional bottleneck model for road congestion promotes the implementation of a triangular, fully time varying, charge as the optimal solution for the road congestion externality. However, cognitive and technological barriers put a practical limit to the degree of differentiation real...