The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This...

This study extends traditional analyses of the voluntary provision of public goods to take account of the behaviour of competitive charities who are able to use advertising expenditures to market themselves to donors and thereby potentially increase donation revenues.

This study extends traditional analyses of the voluntary provision of public goods to take account of the behaviour of competitive charities who are able to use advertising expenditures to market themselves to donors and thereby potentially increase donation revenues.

In two related papers, Kanedo (1977, 1977a) has proved an equibalence theorem relating the set of ratio equilibria of a public goods economy to the core of a strong voting game. This paper extends in two ways Kaneko's analysis to economies with jurisdictions, each producing a spedific public good.

In this paper we investigate the welfare effect of capital income taxation in a standard one commodity general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI) and production. We consider a competitive economy of two periods with uncertainty over a finite number S of possible states of nature...

The purpose of this paper is to provide reasonable microfoundation to justify the concept of a conjectural valuations equilibrium which is often used in the literature on the private provision of public goods by incorporating an explicit dynamic process of learning with the help of the...

The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

A general procedure inspired by the Shapley value is proposed for decompodsing any inequality index by factor components or by populations subgroups. To do so we define two types of inequality games. Although these games cannot be expressed in terms of unanimity games, an axiomatization of the...

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...

This paper argues in favour of introducing solidarity into economics as a new analytical category of human motivation which encompasses all forms of other-regarding behaviour (e.g. utilitarian altruism, evolved natural sympathy, Kantian imperatives) but which, additionally, can be refined so as...