This paper examines the dynamic connections between local wealth inequality and the local politics of property rights within a federal system. We model a jurisdiction comprising a politically dominant in-group and a marginalized out-group. At each date, the jurisdiction tries to redistribute...

We present a model of coalitional property rights (CPR) regimes ? regimes in which ownership of a good is attributable to coalitions of various sizes. Specifically, for each good, we define a legal structure that specifies the legal coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that...

This paper studies the dynamics of property ownership, appropriation, and consent in autocratic political systems. An autocrat representing the interests of an in-group chooses whether and how much to appropriate from public and private assets at each date. To maintain the appearance of the rule...

We present a model of coalitional property rights (CPR) regimes regimes in which ownership of a good is attributable to coalitions of various sizes. Specifically, for each good, we define a legal structure that specifies the legal coalitions of individuals that share a communal claim to that...