Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which...

Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which...

We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for entry to be unprofitable in markets with adverse selection is that that no buyer type be willing to trade at a price above the expected unit cost of serving those types who are weakly more eager to trade than her. We provide two applications...

Versorgungsforschung, gesundheitsökonomische Evaluationen, GKV-Routinedaten, Versorgungsprozesse, Sekundärdaten. - Health services research, health economic evaluations, claims data, secondary data, health care process

Versorgungsforschung, gesundheitsökonomische Evaluationen, GKV-Routinedaten, Versorgungsprozesse, Sekundärdaten. - Health services research, health economic evaluations, claims data, secondary data, health care process