Can competition and the existence of profit-seeking actors in the school market improve educational quality? To see cost-efficient, long-term improvements, we identify the school system's capacity for knowledge-enhancing innovation as crucial and explore this question by examining Swedish...

The Swedish school system suffers from profound problems with teacher recruitment and retention, knowledge decline, and grade inflation. Absenteeism is high, and psychiatric disorders have risen sharply among Swedish pupils in the last ten years. In this pioneering analysis of the consequences...

The Swedish school system suffers from profound problems with teacher recruitment and retention, knowledge decline, and grade inflation. Absenteeism is high, and psychiatric disorders have risen sharply among Swedish pupils in the last ten years. In this pioneering analysis of the consequences...

We review both the theoretical and empirical literature relating to the impact of school choice programs, particularly voucher programs, on residential property values. Beginning with the seminal works of Charles Tiebout (1956) and Thomas Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003), we describe the sorting...

Can competition and the existence of profit-seeking actors in the school market improve educational quality? To see cost-efficient, long-term improvements, we identify the school system’s capacity for knowledge-enhancing innovation as crucial and explore this question by examining Swedish...

This paper makes the following point: “detracking” schools, that is preventing them from allocating students to classes according to their ability, may lead to an increase in income residential segregation. It does so in a simple model where households care about the school peer group of...

We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This...

We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This...

In this paper, we study the house price effects of local school choice opportunities among public primary schools using a rare and large-scale reform that abolished binding catchment areas in North RhineWestphalia, the largest German state with 18 million inhabitants. To estimate the reform's...

We study whether parents value non-test score attributes when choosing school. We exploit an intervention designed to provide hard-to-find information about school environment and day-to-day life at local public-sector institutions. School choice in London provides a unique setting where...