's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the …

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate …

externality to an informed winner, an increase in the number of banks in the market can reduce banks' screening probability …

-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was … auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper …

externality to an informed winner, an increase in the number of banks in the market can reduce banks' screening probability …

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate …

banks can reduce banks' screening probability by so much that the number of banks that actively compete in loan provisions … falls and the expected loan rate rises. This is the case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders to … be informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, in which case there are su±ciently many …

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate …

-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was … auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper …