We present a model of the job market in which the number of workers and companies is uncertain, representing the job search activity as a Poisson game. We allow for heterogeneity of workers and companies and show that in equilibrium more productive types choose higher terms of trade. The Poisson...

This paper presents a model of the jobmarket in which the number of workers and companies is a Poisson random variable, as in Poisson games. The model has undominated equilibria that share some properties with directed search, while preserving some erratic elements typical of random search

An advantage of collective wage agreement is that search and business-stealing externalities can be internalized. A disadvantage is that it takes more time before an optimal allocation is reached because more productive firms (for a particular worker type) can no longer signal this by posting...

This paper presents a search-theoretic model where middlemen can emerge endogenously to intermediate between ex ante homogeneous buyers and sellers in the presence of coordination frictions. Middlemen set price to compete in the market, and hold an inventory to provide a high matching service. I...