In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and off the job for employment opportunities similar to that of Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2013). The worker determines the frequency by which employment opportunities arrive...

In this paper we consider a risk averse worker who is moving back and forth between employment and unemployment; layoffs are random and beyond the worker`s influence, while the reemployment chance is directly affected by search effort. We characterize the worker`s optimal savings and jobsearch...

In this paper, I analyze a general equilibrium on-the-job search model with endogenous search intensity and heterogenous workers and firms. I provide proof of existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium. In equilibrium equally efficient search on and off the job and supermodularity of...

In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and off the job for employment opportunities similar to that of Lentz (2010) and Bagger and Lentz (2013). The worker determines the frequency by which employment opportunities arrive...