Showing 1 - 10 of 1,609
We present an experimental study of decentralized two‐sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental … culminate in the median stable matching. Third, preferences' cardinal representations impact the stable partners with whom …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015423098
We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855668
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014541678
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141000
understand their accomplishments, reviews successful matching processes adopted in particular market institutions. In some … matching algorithm – originally designed by Gale and Shapley (1962) for the college admissions problem – was imbued with … institutions by Roth; (Roth, 1985).Designing optimal matching algorithms has been heavily influenced by the practice of adopting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083403
implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is also well …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716025
We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms in which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. We prove that all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibriumoutcomes are stable, but the inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854651
This paper compares pre-commitment investment strategy in a linear public goods game using two different matching … protocols: assortative and random matching. We express the payoff function as an investment decision in which players pre … assortative matching treatment is remarkably high and is close to 90 percent of the initial endowment, when compared to the random …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028123