We study a search and bargaining model of an asset market, where investors' heterogeneous valuations for the asset are drawn from an arbitrary distribution. Our solution technique makes the model fully tractable and allows us to provide a full characterization of the unique equilibrium, in...

We extend Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen's (2005) search-theoretic model of over-the-counter asset markets, allowing for a decentralized inter-dealer market with arbitrary heterogeneity in dealers' valuations or inventory costs. We develop a solution technique that makes the model fully...

We develop a dynamic model of trading through market-makers that incorporates two canonical sources of illiquidity: trading (or search) frictions, which imply that market-makers have some amount of market power; and information frictions, which imply that market-makers face some degree of...

We study a canonical model of decentralized exchange for a durable good or asset, where agents are assumed to have time-varying, heterogeneous utility types. Whereas the existing literature has focused on the special case of two types, we allow agents' utility to be drawn from an arbitrary...

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an...