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In this paper, we show that stable outcomes exist in matching environments with complementarities, such as social media platforms or markets for patent licenses. Our results apply to both nontransferable and transferable utility settings, and allow for multilateral agreements and those with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012851566
We study a labor market with finitely many heterogeneous workers and firms to illustrate the decentralized (myopic) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and Shubik, 1971). A labor market is unstable if there is at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222185
Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891117
We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms in which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. We prove that all pure strategy subgame perfect equilibriumoutcomes are stable, but the inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854651
. We find that the median value of a quantity contract is 10% of net price. The median value would be 25% lower without …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212967
Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081039
We explore the possibility of designing matching mechanisms that can accommodatenon-standard choice behavior. We pin down the necessary and sufficient conditionson participants’ choice behavior for the existence of stable and incentive compatiblemechanisms. Our results imply that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014241474
Since no stable matching mechanism can induce truth-telling as a dominant strategy for all participants, there is often room in matching markets for strategic misrepresentation (Roth [25]). In this paper we study a natural form of strategic misrepresentation: reporting a truncation of one's true...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756282
Different markets are cleared by different types of prices—seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686665
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499806