This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises with implicit guarantees) and/or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a reputation for not taking risk. For instance, banks...

This paper models the structure of a financial market that is composed of two types of institutions, banks and securities or secondary markets. The model analyzes the development of the securities market as a way of trading off its lower cost of securitization with adverse selection due to...

This paper models incentives for risk-taking by managers of banks or securitization deals. Of particular interest are risk-retention rules for producers of structured securitization deals, which have been mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act; the model can also be applied to bank managers. We show how...

This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises with implicit guarantees) and/or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a reputation for not taking risk. For instance, banks...

The paper provides a framework for analyzing the development of securitization as a vehicle for funding loans. Broadly speaking there are two models for funding loans: the portfolio lender model, which typically involves banks or other intermediaries originating and holding the loans and funding...

This paper models the optimal riskiness of structured securitization deals. The deals are put together by “banks” that hold an equity piece of the deal and can exercise strategic options over the risk put into the deals. The banks face a tradeoff between the benefits of risk-taking now and...