We provide novel evidence that deposit competition incentivizes banks to securitize loans. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as an exogenous source of competition, we document a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize...

We provide novel evidence that bank branching deregulation increased securitization in the lead up to the financial crisis. The exogenous state-specific removal of interstate branching restrictions increases the probability that 1) a bank operates an "originate to distribute" model by 7%, and 2)...

We evaluate lenders' incentives to mitigate credit default risk through pricing or securitisation. Exploiting exogenous variation in credit default risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that lenders in the mortgage market respond to the law in...

We evaluate if lenders price or securitise mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency...

We evaluate if lenders price or securitize mortgages to mitigate credit risk. Exploiting exogenous variation in regional credit risk created by differences in foreclosure law along US state borders, we find that financial institutions respond to the law in heterogeneous ways. In the agency...

We provide novel evidence that deposit competition incentivizes banks to securitize loans. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as an exogenous source of competition, we document a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize...

We study how deposit competition affects a bank’s decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the US as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This...

We examine whether banks manage climate transition risk by securitizing corporate loans. We present two novel results. First, banks are more likely to securitize loans when borrowers increase their carbon emission intensity. Second, securitization serves as a vehicle to shift transition risk,...

We examine how banks manage carbon transition risk by selling loans given to polluting borrowers to less regulated shadow banks in securitization markets. Exploiting the election of Donald Trump as an exogenous shock that reduces carbon risk, we find that banks’ securitization decisions are...

We examine whether banks manage firms’ climate transition risks via corporate loan securitization. Results show that banks are more likely to securitize loans granted to firms that become more carbon-intensive. The effect is more pronounced if banks have a lower willingness to adjust loan...