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Mazza, Isidoro Adolfo - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003798451

Jahn, Elke J.; Wagner, Joachim - 2001

A cross section analysis of 23 OECD members shows that there is an antagonistic relationship between the legal protection of investor interests on the one hand and labour interests on the other: the stronger the legal protection of investor rights in a country, the less developed are the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010509342

Europa-Chauvinismus : der Hochmut der Institutionen

Vaubel, Roland - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001617418

Economic policy and special interest politics

Persson, Torsten - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 108 (1998) 447, pp. 310-327

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001237832

Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers

Laffont, Jean-Jacques - In: European economic review : EER 42 (1998) 3, pp. 673-684

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001246198

Labour's law?

Jahn, Elke J.; Wagner, Thomas - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001596581

Does centralization increase the size of government? : The effects of separation of powers and lobbying

Mazza, Isidoro; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - In: International tax and public finance 9 (2002) 4, pp. 379-389

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001710699

Judicial lobbying : the politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

Iaryczower, Matiás; Spiller, Pablo T.; Tommasi, Mariano - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002815973

'Which is to Be Master,' the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers

Jellum, Linda - 2022

Statutory interpretation is at the cutting edge of legal scholarship and, now, legislative activity. As legislatures have increasingly begun to perceive judges as activist meddlers, some legislatures have found a creative solution to the perceived control problem: statutory directives. Statutory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014213855

Does Centralization Increase the Size of Government? The Effects of Separation of Powers and Lobbying

Mazza, Isidoro; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2003

powerful interest groups able to lobby the EU policymakers. Persson and Tabellini (1994) argue that political centralization … will increase the size of the government through lobbying because of free-riding incentives created by federally funded … the incentives to lobby. The result is an unchanged budget under centralization. Moreover, it is shown that if the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014106828