How to effectively combine performance pay with the traditional payment methods capitation and fee-for-service to improve the quality of care is not well understood. To establish a systematic comparison of physicians’ behavior under these payment methods, we employ a parsimonious experimental...

This paper systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either baseline feefor-service or capitation, affects physicians' medical service provision and the quality of care. Using a series of controlled experiments with physicians and students, we test the incentive effect of...

There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay. Using a behavioral experiment with a representative sample of German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explain...

We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both, their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their...

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

We discuss the impact of organizational workload on professional service outcomes, such as survival rates in hospitals. The prevailing view in the literature is that service quality deteriorates when organizational workload increases. In contrast, we argue that the relationship between workload...