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In cooperative game theory, the Shapley value is a central notion defining a rational way to share the total worth of a game among players. In this paper, we address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication graphs, where the set of feasible coalitions forms a poset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823508
We survey axiomatic results concerning the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). This marginalist allocation rule results from an axiomatic study of the class of coalitional games. Shapley (1953) specifies a list of desirable properties of solutions for this class of games, and he shows that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008595873
Voting power in voting situations is measured by the probability of changing decisions by altering the cast `yes' or `no' votes. Recently this analysis has been extended by strategic abstention. Abstention, just as `yes' or `no' votes can change decisions. This theory is often applied to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147818
We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoffset. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150572
The traditional voting games are special transferable utility cooperative games, so-called simple games, where the players are the parties and the value of a coalition may be 1 or 0 depending on the ability of the coalition to pass a motion or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008668694
Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualified majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a wellknown public gure with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741317
While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming voters behave randomly. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave differently from the indices predictions and propose a model...
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