On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions...

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players. preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning...

A cephoid is an algebraic ("Minkowski") sum of finitely many prisms in R^n. A cephoidal game is an NTU game the feasible sets of which are cephoids. We provide a version of the Shapley NTU value for such games based on the bargaining solution of Maschler-Perles. -- Cephoids ; Bargaining theory ;...

We continue the discussion of the taxation game following our presentation in [12]. Our concept describes a cooperative game played between a set of jurisdictions (" countries"). These players admit the operation of a multinational enterprise (MNE, the "firm") within their jurisdiction. The...

We introduce the Maschler-Perles-Shapley value for NTU games composed by smooth bodies. This waywe extend the M-P-S value established for games composed by Cephoids ("sums of deGua Simplices"). The development is parallel to the one of the (generalized) Maschler-Perles bargaining solution. For...