This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization

We introduce the concept of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (TUUgame). In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature may materialize and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...

By a cooperative game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a set of payoffs for each coalition that is a nonempty subset of the grand coalition of all players. It is well-known that balancedness is a...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoffset. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We study five generalizations of convexity in the NTU setting....

In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this paper we...