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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797620
We consider the problem of how to distribute public expenditure among the different regions of an economic entity after all taxes have been collected. Typical examples are: the regions that make up a country, the states of a federal country, or the countries of a confederation of countries. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012694354
We consider the problem of how to distribute public expenditure among the different regions of an economic entity after all taxes have been collected. Typical examples are: the regions that make up a country, the states of a federal country, or the countries of a confederation of countries. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014496062
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011317
Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623235
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598408
We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: The random marginal and the random removal values. The main characteristic of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837322
We present a noncooperative bargaining protocol among n players, applied to the setting of cooperative games in coalitional form with transferable utility. In this model, players are chosen randomly to make proposals until one is accepted unanimously, and after each proposal rejection, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010548943
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding the cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008830116
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001538187