In this paper, we consider the problem, introduced by Ginsburgh and Zang (Games Econ Behav 43:322–325, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2003</CitationRef>), of sharing the income from the sell of passes that allow the entrance in a set of museums. First, we recall some allocation rules and some properties presented in Ginsburgh and Zang...</citationref>

We consider a von Neumann–Morgenstern market game and present a simple expression for the Shapley value via decomposition as the difference of an airport game and an extended airport game. The resulting formula has a useful interpretation for designing an allocation procedure among the agents.

Microarray technology allows for the evaluation of the level of previous termexpressionnext term of thousands of previous termgenesnext term in previous termanext term sample of cells under previous termanext term given condition. In this paper, we introduce previous termanext term methodology...