Different axiomatizations of the Shapley value for TU games can be found in the literature. The Shapley value has been generalized in several ways to the class of games in partition function form. In this paper we discuss another generalization of the Shapley value and provide a characterization.

This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, once the countries concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement through a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO). Proposing the population monotonic allocation scheme as...

This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment...

This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment...

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature. For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways. In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games. The...