A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities - self-covariance - is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors...

For the class of cooperative games with transferable utilities an excess function e is defined as a function of two variables increasing in the first variable and decreasing in the first one such that given a TU game (N,v) , a coalition S, and a payoff vector x, the value e(v(S), x(S)) is a...

A game with a restricted cooperation is a triple consisting of a finite set of players, a collection of feasible coalitions, and a characteristic function. The class of all games with a restricted cooperation with an arbitrary universal set of players is considered.The prenucleolus and the...

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is...

In this paper we introduce two values for cooperative games with communication graph structure. For cooperative games the shapley value distributes the worth of the grand coalition amongst the players by taking into account the worths that can be obtained by any coalition of players, but does...