In this paper we introduce three-valued simple games as a natural extension<br/>of simple games. While simple games are used to evaluate single voting systems, three-valued simple games offer the opportunity for a simultaneous analysis of two different voting systems within the same parliamentary...

In this paper, we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games). Moreover, we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems. Also, the class of convex...

Abstract: This paper introduces a new class of interactive cooperative purchasing situations and provides an explicit alternative characterization of the nucleolus of cooperative games, which offers an alternative to Kohlberg (1971). In our cooperative purchasing situation, the unit price of a...

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games.We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer.The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer.The Shapley, consensus and...

Abstract: In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. In those models, instead of allowing for all subsets of the set of players to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a proper subset of the power set of the set of players. In this...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU- games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payos change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...

In this paper we define a new family of solutions for the class of cooperative games with transferable utility, in which the set of players exhibits a structure of a priori unions.This family is deeply connected with the Shapley value for games with transferable utility but, moreover, we assume...