We provide an axiomatization-based justification for applying the Owen value to decompose R2 in OLS models if prior knowledge can be used to form groups of regressor variables. The assumptions made by the axioms are not only plausible with respect to the variables but also clarify the meaning of...

We introduce a solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility and a coalition structure that is proportional for two-player games. Our value is obtained from generalizing a proportional value for cooperative games with transferable utility (Ortmann <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2000</CitationRef>) in a way that parallels...</citationref>

We study values for transferable utility games enriched by a communication graph (CO-games) where the graph does not necessarily a¤ect the productivity but can in?uence the way the players distribute the worth generated by the grand coalition. Thus, we can envisage values that are efficient...

The principle of weak monotonicity for cooperative games states that if a game changes so that the worth of the grand coalition and some player's marginal contribution to all coalitions increase or stay the same, then this player's payoff should not decrease. We investigate the class of values...

We provide new characterizations of the equal surplus division value and the equal division value as well as of the class of their convex mixtures. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value is pinpointed to one axiom....