We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1988</CitationRef>) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2001</CitationRef>) on a large space of non-differentiable games....</citationref></citationref>

We prove that a single-valued solution of nonatomic market games (or the perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an...

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are...

We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected paths within the graph. This leads to a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied here from an...