We consider loans being marked to market to constitute new information that is only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors (non-QIBs) do not have instant access to such information. Investigating the effects of...

In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium...

This paper studies the workup protocol, a unique trading feature in the U.S. Treasury securities market that resembles a mechanism for discovering dark liquidity. We quantify its role in the price formation process in a model of the dynamics of price and segmented order flow induced by the...

We study the link between informed trading and co-movement in illiquidity. We argue that investors concerned with liquidity and fire-sale shocks respond to an increase in informed trading by shifting their portfolios away from stocks with high information asymmetry. This rebalancing causes a...

We study how short-term informational advantages can be monetized in a high-frequency setting, when large inventories are explicitly penalized. We find that if most of the additional information is revealed regardless of the high-frequency traders' actions, then fast inventory management allows...

We model a financial market where privately informed investors trade in a limit order book monitored by professional liquidity providers. Price competition between informed limit order submitters and professional market makers allows us to capture tradeoffs between informed limit and market...

This paper studies the impact of public information on trading and market fragmentation in FTSE 100 stocks on the LSE and on Chi-X, the largest multilateral trading facility in Europe. We proxy daily public information through newswire messages which we di erentiate by their ex-ante sentiment....

The unmediated call auction is a useful trading mechanism to aggregate dispersed information. Its ability to incorporate information of a single informed insider, however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simple call auction game where both auction prices and...

The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...