Virtual-only shareholder meetings have become dramatically more common following COVID-19. Analysis of transcripts and recordings of in-person versus virtual-only shareholder meetings show that virtual-only meetings are shorter and dedicate less time to addressing shareholders’ concerns. I...

Mutual fund shareholders are particularly supportive of “overlapping directors”—directors who serve simultaneously on a corporate board and a mutual fund board. Such support is observed on behalf of both connected funds (sharing a director with the company) and non-connected funds (not...

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks...

We find, in three settings, that diversity among large shareholders (i.e., blockholders) is detrimental to firm performance. Specifically, we find that(1) disclosure of an increase in block diversity around an exogenously predetermined date is followed by a negative market reaction, while...

This paper, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance co-sponsored by the Review of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven papers on corporate...