Showing 1 - 10 of 15
Strong corporate governance may bear some costs to shareholders when it leads to the departure of value-enhancing CEOs out of disagreement with the board. We test this hypothesis using the passing of shareholder proposals related to anti-takeover provisions in closely contested votes as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034801
Strong corporate governance may bear some costs to shareholders when it leads to the departure of value-enhancing CEOs out of disagreement with the board. We test this hypothesis using the passing of shareholder proposals related to anti-takeover provisions in closely contested votes as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034960
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033909
We show that close votes on shareholder proposals are disproportionately more likely to be won by management than by shareholder activists. Using a sample of shareholder proposals from 2003 to 2016, we uncover a large and discontinuous drop in the density of voting results at the 50% threshold....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935124
Shareholder votes may create value because they force boards to implement proposals' content or because they signal shareholders' discontent. In order to distinguish these hypotheses, we collect data on the implementation of shareholder proposals. We show that the decision to implement proposals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974492
This paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that increases noncompliance costs in the implementation of shareholder-initiated majority voting proposals is followed by an increase in the submission...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898695
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder “voice” by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064276
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742974
This paper estimates the effect of increasing shareholder "voice" in corporations through a new governance rule that provides shareholders with a regular vote on pay: Say on Pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to Say on Pay shareholder proposals to deal with prior expectations and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722874
This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010414206