We examine shareholder litigation and the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. After the lawsuit filing, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads, up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are...

This paper studies how the conflict of interest between shareholders and creditors affects corporate payout policy. Using mergers between lenders and equity holders of the same firm as shocks to the shareholder-creditor conflict, I show that firms pay out less when there is less conflict between...

I study how the threat of shareholder litigation affects the cost of bank loans using a natural experiment based on a ruling by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Using a difference-in-differences method, I find that increasing the difficulty of securities class action suits decreases loan...

Exploiting staggered adoption of the universal demand (UD) laws by 23 states between 1989 and 2005 that makes filing shareholder derivative litigations more difficult, we show that reduced litigation threats improve corporate takeover efficiency. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we...