Can a DSGE model replicate the financial crisis effects without assuming unprecedented and implausibly large shocks? Starting from the assumption that the subprime crisis triggered the financial crisis, we introduce balance-sheet effects for housing market borrowers and for commercial banks in...

We build a business cycle model characterized by endogenous firm dynamics, where banks may prefer debt renegotiation, i.e. non-performing exposures, to outright borrowers' default. Debt renegotiations per se do not have adverse effects in the event of financial crisis episodes, but a large share...

This paper reconsiders the role of macroeconomic shocks and policies in determining the Great Recession and the subsequent recovery in the US. The Great Recession was mainly caused by a large demand shock and by the ZLB on the interest rate policy. In contrast with previous findings, the...

We build a business cycle model characterized by endogenous firms dynamics, where banks may prefer debt renegotiation, i.e. non-performing exposures, to outright borrowers default. We find that debt renegotiations only do not have adverse effects in the event of financial crisis episodes, but a...

We show that popular models of flight-to-liquidity shocks have strongly counterfactual implicationsfor asset returns and the composition of firms' liabilities, including the return spread between bankdeposits and T-bills and the share of bank loans on corporate debt. Further, the implied...