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Animals' choices over uncertain outcomes : further experimental results

MacDonald, Don N. - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 101 (1991) 408, pp. 1067-1084

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001127891

Testing between alternative models of choice under uncertainty : some initial results

Battalio, Raymond Charles - In: Journal of risk and uncertainty : JRU 3 (1990) 1, pp. 25-50

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001089279

Tests of "fanning out" of indifference curves : results from animal and human experiments

Kagel, John H. - In: The American economic review 80 (1990) 4, pp. 912-921

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001092828

Signalling and adaptive learning in an entry limit pricing game

Cooper, David J. - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 662-683

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001230992

A failure to communicate : an experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic play

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: European economic review : EER 82 (2016), pp. 24-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011785857

The impact of meaningful context on strategic play in signaling games

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 50 (2003) 3, pp. 311-337

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001719581

Behavior in a simplified stock market : the status quo bias, the disposition effect and the ostrich effect

Brown, Alexander L.; Kagel, John H. - In: Annals of finance 5 (2009) 1, pp. 1-14

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003775306

The role of context and team play in cross-game learning

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 7 (2009) 5, pp. 1101-1139

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003889757

Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams : forward induction or faster adaptive learning?

Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H. - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 63 (2009) 4, pp. 216-224

Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho–Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943316

Learning from peers in signaling game experiments

Liu, Xiaodong; Kagel, John H.; Lee, Lung-fei - In: Journal of applied econometrics 27 (2012) 7, pp. 1037-1058

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009677980