Showing 1 - 10 of 7,916
, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may … scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …-comparative advertising. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316055
-comparative advertising. -- advertising ; costly state falsification ; signalling …, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may … scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003923372
Preliminary injunctions (PIs) are important in litigation in many settings, including antitrust, copyright, patent, trademark, employment and labor relations, and contracts. The filing of a PI and the court's ruling generate information that can impact settlement. We find that some plaintiffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117008
I examine the incentives and effort choices of lawyers that reflect their anticipation that those perceived as high-talent lawyers will be able to command higher fees in future contracts they are offered by the observers of their effort levels. The analysis employs three versions of a two-type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014181829
In this paper we use a signaling model to analyze the effect of (endogenously-determined) third-party non-recourse loans to plaintiffs on settlement bargaining when a plaintiff has private information about the value of her suit. We show that an optimal loan (i.e., one that maximizes the joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088917
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246967
We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly voluntary disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical prediction is that costly voluntary disclosures will not occur. This hinges on the prediction that the person...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079903
Contrary to traditional wisdom, judges are not passive receivers of their agendas. Instead, many judges attempt to shape their dockets by encouraging potential litigants to bring particular cases. This encouragement takes the form of judges signaling their own positions on an issue as well as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066112
We develop a signaling model of final offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a proposal to an arbitrator and if no agreement is reached, the arbitrator must select one of the two submitted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868080
We examine how retention motives affect prosecutor behavior under different evaluation criteria. In particular, we analyze how prosecutors of differing capabilities respond in choosing which cases to take to trial and which to plea bargain. We show how different criteria distort the mix of cases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190284