Showing 1 - 10 of 2,235
We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009425287
the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450033
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526
neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472820
Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or willful ignorance, is an … maintain the idea that the agent would have acted virtuously under full information. We derive several behavioral predictions … that are inconsistent with either outcome-based preferences or social-image concern and conduct experiments to test them …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035817
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079831
We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of employers from two to three. In all treatments, there is a strong tendency to separate. More efficient workers invest more often and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319227
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011574866
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242069
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269