neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …

the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We find that …

neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is … likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing …

We find an effect of irrelevant information on adverse selection in a laboratory signaling game. This effect occurs via … suggest that “perception (or perhaps, misperception) of correlation” is sufficient for people to process information. Failure … to recognize information as “irrelevant” is costly: Principals in our experiment are worse off by 3.75 percent. This …

Avoiding information about adverse welfare consequences of self-interested decisions, or willful ignorance, is an … maintain the idea that the agent would have acted virtuously under full information. We derive several behavioral predictions … that are inconsistent with either outcome-based preferences or social-image concern and conduct experiments to test them …