Showing 1 - 10 of 672
We consider repeated trading by sellers with persistent private information in dynamic lemons markets. We compare the outcomes of a transparent market where past trading prices are public to those of an opaque market, where they are private. We characterize the upper bound of trading surplus in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012827075
A principal has to take a binary decision. She relies on information privately held by a completely biased agent. The principal cannot incentivize with transfers but can learn the agent's information at a cost. Additionally, the principal privately observes a signal correlated with the agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865932
We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Econometrica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900076
We find an effect of irrelevant information on adverse selection in a laboratory signaling game. This effect occurs via two channels: the principal is more (less) likely to adversely reject signals from “good” (“bad”) types. The findings suggest that “perception (or perhaps,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115007
This paper purports to provide some evidence on the effect of rating agencies on herding in financial markets. By means of a laboratory experiment, we investigate the effect and interaction between private and public information. Previous experiments showed that lemmings behaviour can survive in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523646
We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly voluntary disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical prediction is that costly voluntary disclosures will not occur. This hinges on the prediction that the person...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079903
The actions that individuals take to minimize the impact of risk generally involve cost. Thus, the actions that provide insurance often provide signals with regard to the individuals' underlying quality characteristics. Since the same action affects risk exposure and signals quality, individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068774
We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly disclosure of private information in a signaling game. Under the theory, 100% of plaintiffs with a weak case are predicted to remain silent, while 100% of the plaintiffs with a strong case are predicted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986925
This paper explores how ambiguous signals and ambiguity aversion influence individuals' expectations and the pricing of asset in experimental financial markets. In line with the theory of Epstein and Schneider (2008) we find that subjects' degree of ambiguity aversion is positively correlated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012835148
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269