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Förster, Manuel; Riedel, Frank - 2011

In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication games of common interest when signals are simple and types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set and Bayesian estimators on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319996

Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals

Jäger, Gerhard; Koch-Metzger, Lars; Riedel, Frank - 2009

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272564

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2013

We consider a game of information transmission, with one informed decision maker gathering information from one or more informed senders. Private information is (conditionally) correlated across players, and communication is cheap talk. For the one sender case, we show that correlation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189326

Cheap talk with correlated signals

Chand, A. K. S.; Currarini, Sergio; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774610

Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information

Metzger, Lars - 2015

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967

Incomplete information and costly signaling in college admissions

Salgado, Alfredo - 2018

We analyze a college admissions game with asymmetric information between students and colleges. Students' preferences for colleges depend on the observable quality of the schools. In contrast, colleges' preferences for students depend on the latter's abilities, which are private information....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012166000

Credible ratings

Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 3 (2008) 3, pp. 325-365

(individual rating), the credibility of a good rating in an inflationary equilibrium of the signaling game is limited by the … average level of credibility for its good ratings than in individual rating. In decentralized rating, the ratings are again … degree of rating inflation and hence a greater level of credibility than in individual rating. Comparing centralized rating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011700252

A model of quality uncertainty with a continuum of quality levels

Gertz, Christopher - 2014 - This version: September 3, 2014

This work takes a closer look on the predominant assumption in usual lemon market models of having finitely many or even only two different levels of quality. We model a situation which is close to the classical monopolistic setting but admits an interval of possible quality values....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403068

Simultaneous signaling in elimination contests

Zhang, Jun (contributor) - 2008

This paper analyzes the signaling effect of bidding in a two-round elimination contest. Before the final round, bids in the preliminary round are revealed and act as signals of the contestants' private valuations. Depending on his valuation, a contestant may have an incentive to bluff or sandbag...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003768858

Mediation as Signal

Holler, Manfred J.; Lindner, Ines - 2012

This paper analyzes mediation as a signal. Starting from a stylized case, a game theoretical model of one-sided incomplete information, taken from Cho and Kreps (1987), is applied to discuss strategic effects of mediation. It turns out that to reject mediation can be interpreted as a "negative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064273