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' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619
), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers’ productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We … characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial … feature new auditing patterns and explain empirical observations in labor economics like wage differentials and comparative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a "vertical slice," or share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137848
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003889431
We analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009518322
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a "vertical slice", or share of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011597154
This paper shows how the fear of signaling distrust can endogenously lead to incomplete contractual agreements. According to standard results in contract theory an optimal incentive contract should be conditional on all verifiable information containing statistical information about an agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724994
This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator's choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a “vertical slice,” or share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095602
This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126