In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) senders...

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...

We study the role of dropout risk in dynamic signaling. A seller privately knows the quality of an indivisible good and decides when to trade. In each period, he may draw a dropout shock that forces him to trade immediately. To avoid costly delay, the seller with a low-quality good voluntarily...

Commitment to support diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) has become a priority for American firms to meet current and future compliance, attract top talents, boost innovation, and improve financial performance. Due to its infancy, there is an ongoing debate and a lack of empirical studies...