Many public goods can be provided at different spatial levels. Evidence from social identity theory and in-group favoritism raises the possibility that where higher-level provision is more efficient, subjects' narrow concern for local outcomes (parochialism) could harm efficiency. Building on...

Many public goods can be provided at different spatial levels. Evidence from social identity theory and in-group favoritism raises the possibility that where higher-level provision is more efficient, subjects’ narrow concern for local outcomes (parochialism) could harm efficiency. Building on...

Experimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is...

Many modern organisations collect data on individuals’ personality traits as part of their human resource selection processes. We test experimentally whether revealing information on personality data impacts on pro-social behaviour as measured in a one-shot modified dictator game and a public...

Group compensation and public announcement of performance are two common aspects of working with other people. We randomly assign these aspects to real-effort tasks. Following task completion and payment, subjects are given an unexpected opportunity to donate to a local charity. Group...

Group compensation and public announcement of performance are two common aspects of working with other people. We randomly assign these aspects to real-effort tasks. Following task completion and payment, subjects are given an unexpected opportunity to donate to a local charity. Group...