We consider a network game based on matching pennies with two types of agents, conformists and rebels. Conformists prefer to match the action taken by the majority of her neighbors while rebels like to match the minority. We investigate the simultaneous best response dynamic focusing on the...

We analyze the evolution of fashion based on a network game model. Each agent in this model is either a conformist or a rebel. A conformist prefers to take the action most common among her neighboring agents, whereas a rebel prefers the opposite. When there is only one type of agent, the model...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and...

The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and...