We consider a strategic online social network that controls information flows between agents in a social learning setting. Agents on the network select among products of competing firms of unknown quality. The network sells advertising to firms. We consider display advertising, which is standard...

In online social networks, social information, i.e., content generated and shared by users (e.g., past purchases), can be a substitute for sponsored advertising, which constitutes the network's main source of revenue. When will social information be let to spread freely over the platform? We...

We consider a strategic online social network that controls information flows between agents in a social learning setting. Agents on the network select among products of competing firms of unknown quality. The network sells advertising to firms. We consider display advertising, which is standard...

This paper introduces a simple model of endogenous network formation and systemic risk. In the model, firms form joint ventures called ‘links' which are subsequently subjected to shocks that are either good or bad. Bad shocks incentivize default. Links yield full benefits only if the...

This paper introduces a model of endogenous network formation and systemic risk. In it, agents form networks that efficiently trade-off the possibility of systemic risk with the benefits of trade. Second, fundamentally ‘safer' economies generate higher interconnectedness, which in turn leads...