In the presence of idiosyncratic risk, the public revelation of information about uncertain aggregate outcomes such as policy choices can be detrimental to social welfare. By announcing informative signals on non-insurable aggregate risk, the policy maker distorts agents' insurance incentives...

Do public policy signals improve the alignment of market outcomes with economic fundamentals? Existing work contends that, when individual players have an incentive to coordinate their actions, public policy signals could steer these actions away from the fundamentals. We argue that such a...

In this paper, I study the model in Morris and Shin (2002) under strategic information transmission constraints between the public authority and private agents in order to investigate how the precision of the public signal affect the quality of the communication. In the model, a central bank...

What are the implications of rational inattention for the effects of public information on individual behavior and in turn welfare? I examine the impact of rational inattention to public information in the "beauty contest" model of Morris and Shin (2002). I show that with information processing...