The idea that people follow trust norms when making trust decisions is developed in an evolutionary model of adaptive play by boundedly rational agents. Because it neither implies nor is it implied by cooperation, trust is not modelled as cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma but as a coordination...

Rational behaviour is required for markets to function efficiently; but myopic rational behaviour could work against pro-social choice, limit creativity, and minimise the extent of cooperative action. This tension is a serious drawback of the recent promotion of markets in developing countries...

We explore the extent to which information about the social value orientation (SVO) of group members influences contributions to a public good. We compare four networks of information - empty, pair, star and complete. We find that information about SVO has a significant impact on contributions...

In this paper we analyse the effect that nai͏̈ve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling nai͏̈ve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational...

An individual’s contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will...