We consider the aggregation of individual agents' von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries into a social planner's von Neumann-Morgenstern preference. We start from Harsanyi's [18] axiomatization of utilitarianism, and ask under which conditions a social preference order that satisfies...

We study a cardinal model of voting with three alternatives where voters' von Neumann Morgenstern utilities are private information. We consider voting protocols given by two-parameter scoring rules, as introduced by Myerson (2002). For these voting rules, we characterize symmetric Bayes Nash...

We consider the aggregation of individual agents' von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries into a social planner's von Neumann-Morgenstern preference. We start from Harsanyi's axiomatization of utilitarianism, and ask under which conditions a social preference order that satisfies...